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From expert judgment to model based monetary analysis:  
the case of the Dutch Central Bank in the postwar period 
 
Frank A.G. den Butter and Harro Maas1  
 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the history of the shift from expert to model based monetary policy 
analysis at the Dutch Central Bank (DNB) in the postwar period up to the middle of the 
nineteen-eighties. For reasons that will become clear expert based reasoning at DNB was 
referred to as normative impulse analysis. Our focus is on two aspects of this shift: (i) from 
an expert based monetary analysis to a model based analysis of channels of monetary 
transmission, and (ii) from the top down way of monetary analysis where the president of 
DNB acted as the monetary expert that was in line with the hierarchical organisation of 
DNB to the bottom up modelling approach that was set up by a group of newly hired young 
academic outsiders and destabilized DNB’s organisation. The resulting econometric model 
enabled DNB to regain some of its argumentative strength in the Dutch policy arena that had 
become dominated by the econometric model of the Dutch Planning Bureau (of which 
Tinbergen was the first director), but also led to tensions within DNB’s organisation. In spite 
of efforts to incorporate the main aspects of Holtrop’s monetary analysis within the model, 
its concomitant new research group appeared difficult to integrate within the hierarchical 
organisation of DNB. The model analysis resulted in the MORKMON model which 
replaced Holtrop’s analysis in the mid 1980s and was regularly used in policy analysis and 
forecasting of DNB until 2011, when the model was replaced by the DELFI model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 1969 dr. W.F. Duisenberg advised the Governing Board of the Nederlandsche Bank 
(DNB), the Dutch central bank, to release a group of research staff from their day-to-day 
routine to perform systematic econometric research on monetary issues. After his return to 
the Netherlands from the United States as staff member of the IMF, Duisenberg was added 
as advisor to the Board where he found himself confronted with a strong tradition of 
analysing monetary phenomena set up by dr. M.W. Holtrop who had been Governor 
(“President”) of the Bank in the period 1946-1967. Duisenberg assisted the Bank’s former 
president in estimating an econometric version of his monetary analysis (published as 
Holtrop, 1972a), but he was shocked by the Bank’s lack of knowledge of modern monetary 
economics and econometrics that could meet international standards and that he was 
acquainted with at the IMF. This motivated his advice.  
 
In 1970 Duisenberg left the Bank to become professor of economics at the University of 
Amsterdam, and somewhat later Minister of Finance. But his advice resulted in the 
establishment of the Econometric Research and Special Studies Section of the Bank’s 
research department that was largely recruited from outside of the Bank. The task of this 
group of young economists and econometricians, with dr. M.M.G. Fase at its head, was to 
provide the Bank with modern insights from economic theory and with a model based 
analysis in the Dutch tradition of Tinbergen, that could eventually replace Holtrop’s 
monetary analysis. This task was, in a way, completed in the mid 1980’s with the 
publication of the first version of the MORKMON model (De Nederlandsche Bank, 1984, 
1985, Den Butter, 1988). MORKMON is an acronym (in Dutch) for Monetary Real 
Quarterly Model for the Netherlands. Again it was Duisenberg, but now as Governor of the 
Bank, who was involved in this shift from the old to a new monetary analysis.  
 
This paper discusses the transition from Holtrop’s normative monetary analysis to a model 
based policy analysis from two perspectives. First, from the perspective of the history of 
economic thought and secondly, from the organizational perspective of how a top down 
oriented setup of policy preparation was replaced with a bottom up designed method in the 
very hierarchical setting of the central bank of those days.  
 
Holtrop’s analysis was firmly rooted in the Interwar tradition of the theory on the neutrality 
of money and aimed to identify the sources of disturbances that could bring the economy out 
of equilibrium. Holtrop’s monetary analysis found its roots in monetary debates in the 
interwar period that can be traced to the notion of ‘neutral money’. Holtrop’s analysis still 
provided guidance for monetary policy after Dr. J. Zijlstra, a former Prime Minister of the 
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Netherlands, succeeded him in 1967.  Holtrop’s analysis was known as his ‘normative 
impulse analysis’. It was normative in that he aimed at sterilizing these disturbances as much 
as possible so that inflationary pressure were avoided. Internationally, Holtrop’s theory, that 
was exclusively concerned with influences of the monetary sector on the economy, was 
referred to as Dutch monetarism.  
 
Econometric models from the 1950’s to the 1970’s, in the Netherlands and in the rest of the 
world mainly focused on the real sector of the economy. The task of the newly appointed 
young academics in the research department of the Bank was to add a monetary sector to 
such models and pay ample attention to the channels of monetary transmission. Two roads 
were followed to try and get these new and unknown ideas and techniques accepted by the 
older staff and research management of the bank. The first road was to seek academic 
recognition by publishing research output in the main international and Dutch academic 
journals. The second road was to link the new econometric model, in which economic 
mechanisms were explicitly modelled by means of behavioural equations, as much as 
possible to the concepts used in Holtrop’s normative analysis.  
 
We proceed as follows. The next section contains a review of the theoretical background and 
practical policy use of Holtrop’s normative analysis. Attention is paid to the academic 
discussions between Holtrop and others in the literature. Section 3 shows what steps were 
taken in order to come to a model based alternative to Holtrop’s analysis. The problems on 
how to get this new approach accepted with management and senior staff used to the 
Holtrop tradition are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
  
2.  Holtrop’s normative analysis 
 
A top down approach 
Marius Holtrop took offices as governor of the Central Bank in 1946. Before the war 
Holtrop had worked in business, of which some three years for Shell Company in San 
Francisco. During the war he had been one of the directors of the Dutch Steel company 
Hoogovens. After the war, the Minister of Finance Lieftinck offered Holtrop, of unspoken 
behaviour during the war, to become governor of the Central Bank. One might wonder why 
this post was offered to someone from the world of business. But Holtrop combined a 
background in business with strong academic credentials in monetary analysis, which made 
him, in the eyes of Lieftinck, the perfect candidate for the difficult task that was ahead of 
him.  
 
In the interwar period, Holtrop studied economics in Amsterdam and he was the first student 
to continue his studies at the City University of Amsterdam (now University of Amsterdam) 
for a PhD-thesis in the economics department. His supervisor was professor Herman Frijda 
- 3 - 
 
and his thesis subject was the velocity of money (Holtrop, 1928). After a historical review of 
the troops, Holtrop examined current theoretical debates. He extensively discussed the 
Cambridge version of the quantity theory M = kPT, that emphasized motives for holding 
cash-balances and (dis)hoarding, a discussion that would be of consequence for his later 
monetary analysis. Holtrop considered his investigation into the liquidity preference of the 
different actors in the economy an investigation into the different behavioural causes 
influencing the velocity of money. The bend of the thesis was theoretical rather than 
empirical; no attempt was made to measure the velocity of money (or any other relevant 
monetary concept). Looking back in the early fifties, Holtrop considered his thesis 
contribution to consist in the application of insights from the field of business economics to 
the field of monetary theory.  
 
One of the main influences on his monetary thinking in this period was the Dutch monetary 
economist Johan Gerbrand Koopmans, who was a strong advocate of the idea of ‘neutral 
money’.2 This idea, that we will explain in more detail below, meant that changes in the 
money supply should not disturb the demand and supply of goods and services in the 
economy. After having defended his thesis in 1928 Holtrop solicited for a position at the 
DNB, but unsuccessfully, after which he moved into the world of business.  
 
After the war one of the major tasks of the Bank was the normalisation of the monetary 
system. Holtrop had to start almost from scratch. He was keenly aware of the importance of 
a research department and hired Cornelis Goedhart, a monetary economist who was also 
deeply influenced by the monetary analysis of Koopmans. As Holtrop’s biographer Wim 
Vanthoor (1993, 76) puts it, Holtrop and Goedhart spoke the same language. After 
Goedhart’s appointment as full professor at the University of Amsterdam in 1952, Geldolph 
Adriaan (Dolf) Kessler, son of the president of the Dutch Steel company Holtrop worked for 
during the war, took over as head of research. The tandem Holtrop-Kessler would dominate 
monetary analysis at the Bank throughout Holtrop’s entire presidency - Kessler himself 
would retire halfway the 1980s but left the research department much earlier to become one 
of the Bank’s directors. Yet, as director responsible for research he kept a keen interest in 
the work of the department and became the main intermediary between the new type of 
econometric research and the tradition of monetary analysis at the Bank. 
 
Holtrop was an impressive and dominant personality, son of a family of actors. He was very 
charming, but all of a sudden could change mood. He was not only very much in command, 
but also wanted to be in control. When walking through the premises of the Bank, he knew 
where the offices of all of the staff and their assistants were located, and would comment 
                                                 
2 Johan Gerbrand Koopmans is unrelated to the internationally better known Tjalling C. Koopmans, 
PhD student of Tinbergen, second director of the Cowles Commission, and Nobel Memorial Prize 
Laureate in economics.  
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when he found somebody out of his or her office. Internationally he was much respected as 
an economist who was both leading in the theoretical field of monetary economics in the 
postwar period, and in applying theory to monetary policy. In 1946 Holtrop became member 
of the Board of Directors of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basle, 
Switzerland, where he was elected President in 1958. Meetings of the Board provided 
occasions for the governors of central banks to informally discuss matters of monetary 
theory and policy. Holtrop became a very active discussant in these evening gatherings in 
front of an open wood fire in Hotel Euler in Basle. More formally he was invited in 1958 to 
give evidence before the Radcliffe Committee in the UK, and in 1962 before the Royal 
Commission on Banking and Finance of Canada. His reputation as a leading monetary 
economist was confirmed by his election as Fellow of the Royal Academy of Sciences in the 
Netherlands. Holtrop, a man of business with an academic background and interest, became 
in the postwar period an internationally highly esteemed central banker with academic 
cachet. In the Dutch context, to question his judgment was to question his authority as a 
central banker. 
 
Holtrop’s academic and international stature was reflected in the hierarchical organization of 
the Bank. It was Holtrop who decided on monetary policy and it was Holtrop who crafted 
the theoretical arguments in support. As we will see, there were ample discussions about 
Holtrop’s monetary analysis, but discussants came from outside the Bank, and mostly from 
academia. Within the Bank, Holtrop used Goedhart and later Kessler as his sparring partners 
in designing and extending the analysis and policy framework. Johan Koopmans once 
described Holtrop’s way of working as that of a detective. Sparring with Goedhart or 
Kessler, Holtrop looked for clues in the statistical and other materials to probe into the 
causal chain of monetary events over the past year.  
 
In this period the econometric models constructed at the official Dutch institute for 
economic policy preparation, the Central Planning Bureau (CPB), headed by first Nobel 
memorial prize Laureate Jan Tinbergen, increasingly became the platform for socio-
economic policy preparation of the Dutch government. But Holtrop referred derogatory to 
its “silly behavioural equations”  and far too optimistic and short-sighted forecasts, that he in 
platforms for Dutch economic policy preparation such as the Social Economic Council 
balanced with his more pessimistic judgment of past and future events. The task of the staff 
members of the Bank was to give precision to Holtrop’s judgment, and to see to it that 
statistical data were collected in a format that matched the concepts of his analysis (see e.g. 
Van Straaten, 1989). In short, monetary theory and practice was developed top down at the 
Bank. Inside and outside of the Bank, the saying was that “Holtrop was the Bank, and the 
Bank was Holtrop”. 
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There is evidence that even within the Bank Holtrop’s monetary analysis as well as his 
dominant top down way of working was not unquestioned. After he stepped down, a 
window opened to alter the Bank’s monetary analysis. By then, in 1967, it was more 
generally considered that the earlier internationally advanced research position of the Bank 
had been lost and that the Bank had lost credibility within the Dutch policy landscape as 
well to the Central Planning Bureau and its econometric models. The new Board of DNB 
clearly felt the need to innovate.  
 
Thus, Duisenberg’s advice, to establish a new econometric section at the Bank that would be 
in line with international developments, received favourable hearing. It became the task of 
Fase’s team, which for the occasion we label ESS (the Econometric Studies Section), to use 
this opportunity and bring the monetary analysis and policies of the Bank in line with up to 
date economic theory and econometric methods. Holtrop’s resistance against econometric 
modelling had become part of the research culture of DNB and so this proved an uphill 
struggle. Before we turn to the work of ESS, we will first detail the monetary analysis that 
developed under Holtrop’s presidency.   
 
Dutch monetary analysis in the interwar period 
Holtrop’s monetary analysis is commonly referred to as ‘Dutch monetarism’(Selden 1975). 
Fase (1994) showed that this tradition goes back to discussions in the interwar period on the 
neutrality of money for which some smaller papers of Schumpeter and the Austrian school 
of economics more at large were particularly important. Dutch monetarism got its initial 
shape in the work of the Dutch economist Johan Koopmans. Following Fase’s account 
Koopmans developed a monetary analysis that hinged on the notion of “neutral money”. For 
Koopmans, the benchmark to understand the influence of money on an economy was an 
(imaginary) barter economy in which of necessity there is equivalence between supply and 
demand. Once money is introduced this equivalence no longer holds and so may lead to 
situations of excess demand or supply. These in their turn cause for inflationary or 
deflationary pressures on the general price level. The purpose of monetary policy, in 
Koopmans’s views, was to regulate the money supply to ensure parallelism between the 
flows of money and goods (Fase 1994, 24). If that were the case money would play a neutral 
role in the economy.  
 
Whatever its merits may have been, Koopmans’s ideas were widely debated in the interwar 
period, amongst others by Jan Tinbergen, Gerard Marius Verrijn Stuart and Robert van 
Genechten. Coordinates of this discussion were the “inner value of money” (Verrijn Stuart), 
the narrowness and incompleteness of Koopmans’s analysis of a money economy 
(Tinbergen), and the appropriate indicator to measure the neutrality of money (Van 
Genechten). This last discussion zoomed in on how to measure a stable money flow and 
what price index was most appropriate to indicate the value of money. In the interwar period 
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these questions did not come to a satisfactory conclusion. After the war Holtrop’s major 
contribution was the development of an operational criterion for Koopmans’s concept of the 
neutrality of money. This criterion shaped Dutch monetary politics in the post-war era.  
 
The neutrality of money and monetary equilibrium 
The annual reports of the Central Bank reflect this development. Holtrop defined a neutral 
functioning of a money economy as a situation of monetary equilibrium where money 
creation and dishoarding were in equilibrium with their counterparts. Each monetary report 
contained a section on monetary developments over the previous year. The first drafts of this 
section were written by Holtrop in person and carefully policed by him in a go-between with 
the research department. In this section Holtrop tried to identify what sectors in the economy 
could be held “responsible” for a disruption of monetary equilibrium and to what extent. In 
his quest for responsibility Holtrop distinguished between disruptions that were 
“autonomous” and “induced”. For example, dishoarding by the private sector might be the 
result of a change within that sector or might be the inevitable consequence of actions that 
were imposed from outside upon the private sector. In the first case Holtrop considered the 
impulse autonomous, in the second induced. ‘Impulse’ thus was a generic term that 
indicated a behavioural response of a particular sector in the economy. The decomposition 
of the nature of this response depended on Holtrop’s and the research department’s yearly 
assessment of some fundamental statistics that were collected within the Bank’s research 
department or by institutes such as the Central Bureau of Statistics in The Hague. The policy 
aim of the analysis was to come to a target for the money stock, and so to a target for 
liquidity creation by the banks, so that the ratio between liquidities and nominal national 
income would remain constant. Thus, money supply and national product should grow in the 
same rate so that, given the liquidity preferences of all sectors in the economy neither dearth 
or abundance of money would disrupt the flow of transactions.  
 
In particular, this analysis made the liquidity ratio (or velocity of money) of central 
importance in Holtrop’s decisions on monetary policy: in case of a too rapid rise of the 
liquidity ratio above some target level, banks in the Netherlands were confronted with direct 
credit restrictions, which limited their scope for (further) liquidity creation. From a macro-
perspective, during Holtrop’s presidency, this policy of direct credit restriction has been 
used to combat inflation (the “official” macro-economic task of the Bank), and for 
stabilisation policy (see Fase and Den Butter, 1977). Parts of Holtrop’s monetary analysis, 
derived from the concept of the neutrality of money, have been preserved as guiding 
principles in the actual  monetary policy of DNB after he stepped down as president. This is 
especially true for the so called causes or sources of money creation, which distinguished 
between autonomous monetary impulses and monetary impulses which could be regulated 
and fixed by policy.  
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Because of their practical relevance for monetary policy these parts  - liquidity ratio and 
causes of money creation - of Holtrop’s monetary analysis were used as stepping stones to 
link his analysis to the model based set up of the monetary analysis that the team of Fase 
was asked to develop. More specifically, three elements of Holtrop’s way of looking at 
monetary equilibrium and possible disturbances were considered important:  (i) the 
modelling of monetary impulses and their role in monetary transmission (the IS-curve), (ii) 
the use of the liquidity ratio and its connection with money demand (feedback mechanisms 
from the real economy), and (iii) the allocation of liquidity creation to various sources. The 
latter provided a clue which items on the sector balance sheets had to be explained by 
behavioural equations in the monetary model. The role of these parts in Holtrop’s  analysis 
is shortly discussed in the next subsections. 
 
Monetary impulses 
Holtrop’s analysis of monetary impulses did not aim at explaining movements in major 
macroeconomic aggregates such as income and the balance of payments. It merely served to 
indicate what monetary conditions enabled the movements of such aggregates and to 
localize disturbances of a monetary nature. The analysis served diagnostic purposes. That is 
why Kessler (1972) called the Bank’s analysis a condition model as contrasted to a causal 
model. Holtrop’s formal statement of his analysis did not include behavioural equations, 
even though it included assumptions on normal values for holding cash balances and for the 
import ratio. Formally stated, the model consisted solely of identities representing 
equilibrium conditions that could be used to calculate monetary disturbances. Such a formal 
statement was not set up in terms of exogenous and endogenous variables and even on the 
number of equations no explicit information could be found in Holtrop’s description of it. If 
one thinks about this model as stating the conditions of monetary equilibrium, it is not of 
much importance to know which variables are endogenous and which are exogenous. As the 
equations do not suggest the direction of causality and are merely identities, rewriting the 
identities is merely reformulating the equilibrium conditions.  
 
Holtrop’s model basically consisted of 4 identities (or monetary condition equations) : 
 
  ∆L = Lcr + B       (1) 
  Lact = k∆Y + ∆L       (2) 
  D  = Lcr + Lact       (3) 
  E = B + ∆M, where ∆M = m∆Y    (4) 
 
In equation (1) the change in the money stock, ∆L is calculated as the sum of domestic 
liquidity creation, Lcr, and the inflow of money from abroad, B. Here B represents the 
national liquidity surplus which stems from the balance of payments position. Equation (1) 
can be considered a simple money supply equation. Equation (2) determines liquidity 
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activation, Lact, as the sum of money needed from the perspective of the demand for money 
(k∆Y) and the change in the money supply. Here Y is income and k = Lt-1/Yt-1 the liquidity 
ratio from the previous period representing a kind of normative equilibrium money demand 
elasticity. Equation (3) gives the domestic monetary impulse, D, as sum of domestic 
liquidity creation and domestic liquidity activation. Finally, equation (4) determines the 
external monetary impulse, E, which is equal to inflow of money from abroad plus the 
change in imports from the current year (∆M), derived from a simple import equation where 
m is the marginal import ratio. This correction of E with ∆M has to do with Holtrop’s 
assumption that an outflow of liquidities to other countries induced by a rise in income, 
comes to an end after 12 months, for instance because by then exports have increased 
sufficiently (see Kessler, 1972).3  
 
 In a paper read to the Royal Netherlands Academy of Sciences, in September 1970, after his 
retirement, Holtrop tried to measure the effects of the monetary impulses on changes on 
national income by means of regression analysis (published as Holtrop, 1972). This can be 
considered an attempt to explicitly estimate the behavioural aspects of his monetary 
analysis, and Duisenberg, as mentioned before, helped Holtrop to run the regressions. This 
empirical extension of the Holtrop model showed some similarity with the small empirical 
model of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis of the 1960s and 1970s, where changes in 
income are explained by monetary and fiscal impulses (see e.g., Kuné, 1972). However, 
Holtrop did not consider fiscal impulses, but only investigated the influence of autonomous 
and induced monetary impulses on income changes.  
 
Liquidity ratio as monetary indicator 
As we saw above, the main concern of Holtrop’s monetary analysis was the responsibility of 
the central bank to keep domestic liquidity creation in line with money demand. During 
Holtrop’s governorship, and considerable time afterwards, the liquidity ratio (as the inverse 
of the income velocity of money) acted as the main indicator and target for monetary policy. 
The liquidity ratio was thus of much more importance for monetary policy than the interest 
rate. It should be noted that in the postwar period discussed here, there was not yet a direct 
inflation targeting of monetary policy, but monetary policy was mainly directed at 
intermediate targeting. The use of the liquidity ratio in practical monetary policy in the 
Netherlands in those days boiled down to the simple rule that, when the increase of the 
                                                 
3 This way of calculating the external impulse had been subject of extensive discussions 
with J.J. Polak (see Polak 1957, Polak and Boissonneault, 1960). Polak was a former 
assistant to Tinbergen for his work on business cycles at the League of Nations end of the 
1930s. As head of research at the IMF Polak had developed a small model that was very 
similar in outlook to that of Holtrop, but did not use the notion of equilibrium nor limited the 
effects of monetary impulses to one year (see also Polak, 1998).  
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liquidity ratio was considered too high compared to the equilibrium condition, banks were 
asked to restrain their domestic liquidity creation. Occasionally this request had the form of 
a direct credit restriction.  
 
The rationale behind this rule related to the normal, or non-inflationary, demand for 
liquidities resulting from the transactions motive. Holtrop called this motive the liquidity 
requirement. Obviously, it was of great importance to possess reliable and “correct” data on 
the liquidity ratio, as this ratio played such a decisive role in monetary policy. The first issue 
to decide upon, therefore, was the definition of money (or liquidity).  First, liquidity at the 
macro-level was defined as M1: coins, banknotes and demand deposits. But Holtrop would 
soon prefer a broader concept of money, namely M2, including secondary liquid assets such 
as time deposits and foreign currency holdings.  During and after Holtrop’s presidency, there 
were long discussions in the staff of the Bank  whether to include savings deposit in the 
money definition. Money including all savings deposits is labelled as M3. However, in the 
analysis of the Bank a distinction was made between “genuine savings” to be included in 
M3, and “liquid savings” with banks that were part of M2. The velocity of circulation of 
these savings was the separating criterion. A second issue was the fact that in the liquidity 
ratio L/Y, the money stock L is a stock variable, measured e.g. at the end of a time period, 
but the income Y is a flow variable, measured over a whole time period. Yet, for a proper 
“nowcast” of the liquidity ratio a measure of Y at the end of the period was required. 
Therefore great efforts were made by the statisticians of the Bank to come up with a pseudo 
“end of period” estimate of Y. A serious complication of this rule is that the use of the 
liquidity ratio as a compass in monetary analysis implicitly assumes an income elasticity of 
the required and desired demand for money of unity.  
 
Sources of liquidity creation 
Initially, Holtrop’s monetary impulse analysis moved by tables and graphs. From 1948 the 
Annual Report’s section on monetary and financial developments contained a table listing 
the “causes” of change of the domestic money supply. These causes referred to relevant 
sectors of the economy, such as central and lower government, the private sector (firms and 
households), the banking sector and the foreign sector. The statistical data in the tables 
largely follow from the accounts of the sectors, but where necessary were completed with 
estimates. This table with ‘causes’ or ‘sources’ of money creation were even in the 1990’s 
still published in the Annual Reports and Quarterly Statistics of the Netherlands Bank. The 
table distinguishes four main sources: 
1. Liquidity creation on behalf of public authorities; 
2. Liquidity creation arising from net money creating operations of the banks; 
3. Inflows of liquidity from abroad to the non-monetary sectors- the so called liquidity 
surplus; 
4. Miscellaneous items. 
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The combination of balance sheet items attributed money creation, and in a sense the 
responsibility for money creation,  to three different sectors, namely (i) the government, (ii) 
the banking sector and (iii) the foreign sector. The miscellaneous item is a residual in the set 
up of the table. These four sources register the relevant changes in the counterparts of the 
domestic money supply in the aggregated balance sheet of the money creating institutions 
(banks plus central bank). The four respective counterparts are (a) public authority floating 
debt, (b) the so-called net money-creating operations, (c) the net foreign assets including the 
official gold and exchange holdings of the Netherlands bank, and (d) the balance of various 
assets and liabilities of banks. The latter counterpart is mainly composed of items in transit 
(float) and of aggregated net profits of banks.  
 
3. Model based monetary analysis  
 
The bottom up approach 
When Fase was hired by the Bank in 1971 to set up a team which, following Duisenberg’s 
recommendation, was to conduct empirical research in accordance with modern scientific 
standards, this implied a radical change in the administrative and research culture at the 
Bank. No longer was monetary analysis developed top down, with the Governor of the Bank 
as intellectual father, but now the team of young academics and outsiders to the culture of 
the Bank was given the task to perform monetary analysis.  
 
One of the main problems the new team faced was how to familiarize the existing research 
management of the Bank and the senior staff members with this new bottom up approach. 
For ESS it was a challenge to have the monetary model specified in such a way that the 
sources of liquidity creation distinguished by the Bank could be explained by behavioural 
equations so that the model shed light on the underlying causes of money creation. It would 
also imply that the model could show how undesired money creation from one of the 
sources could be reduced or compensated using the instruments of monetary policy. This 
opened an important opportunity to link the structural model based analysis to Holtrop’s 
conditional monetary analysis and to obtain support from the senior staff at the bank for the 
econometric approach.  
 
The benchmark for econometric modelling in the Netherlands was set by the models of the 
Central Planning Bureau (CPB), which were in the 1970’s still completely in line with the 
Tinbergen tradition of policy modelling. It was therefore natural that some of the newly 
hired ESS members were econometricians familiar with the techniques of economic 
modelling and time series analysis in the Tinbergen tradition. It was also natural that the 
team would ‘look at’ the modelling practice at the CPB to learn the necessary skills and 
techniques for developing an in-house econometric model. Yet, there would be differences 
in the skills and techniques required for building the Bank’s model, because the model of the 
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CPB did not include a monetary or financial sector (which were – and still are -  notoriously 
hard to model).  
 
The pilot studies 
To learn and adapt these skills, in the first years of ESS a number of pilot studies was 
conducted, which made the team familiar with empirical modelling of monetary phenomena. 
In addition, empirical models constructed at other central banks with a financial sector were 
studied. The forerunners in those days were the Bank of Canada (Helliwell et al., 1971) and 
the Banca d’Italia (Fazio et al., 1970). The team also looked at the models of the CPB to 
learn how to make model simulations for policy purposes, a model use that was high on the 
list of the management of the Bank. For that reason the team set out to replicate the 
quarterly model that had been developed at the CPB in the beginning of the 1970s by Wim 
Driehuis (see Fase at al., 1976). This model was  used  as a foil to learn about the practical 
difficulties of data-management and computational problems and to cope with abstruse 
issues that emerged when crafting a structural model for internal use of the Bank. Of course, 
it also involved some discussion with  the staff of the CPB. An important task was the 
development of in-house software that would allow the group to perform simulation 
exercises on the model. The FORTRAN-compiler of the Bank’s NCR computer turned out 
to be so unreliable that remote access was established with the CDC computer at the Energy 
Research Centre, which was designed for scientific calculations and which was also used by 
the CPB.4 
 
One of the “disappointments” of this exercise with the Driehuis-model was that it turned out 
to be impossible to replicate the original results of the model. This was because the data-
material Driehuis had worked with was in the possession of the CPB and not available to the 
public. Also, the CPB had re-estimated some of the equations of the original model on a data 
set with a different base year, and ESS had to use these data for their exercises. Despite 
these difficulties, the exercise showed that the lag-structure of the CPB model was ill-
motivated, whereas these lags were of great importance in assessing the effectiveness of 
different policy measures within the model context. ESS was also sceptical about the claim 
that the CPB model was based on  “micro-foundations” and suggested a more pragmatic and 
eclectic attitude instead. The team’s view was that one should not overstretch expectations 
with regard to “theory” and use theory to “order thinking” (Fase et al., 1976). A major 
reason to consider the Driehuis-model was that it was based on quarterly data. ESS had 
decided to use quarterly data for its empirical analyses whenever possible and also to 
eventually build a quarterly model. That was also in line with the needs of the Bank as it 
published from 1968 onwards besides the traditional Annual Reports also Quarterly 
Bulletins, containing quarterly data of the major monetary variables and providing a survey 
                                                 
4 The Energy Research Centre contained a small nuclear reactor (that is still in use). It is located in 
Petten in a quite part of the Northern dunes of the Netherlands, close to the North-Sea.  
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of economic developments in the recent quarter. Many of these data had to be seasonally 
adjusted. That is why Fase and his team paid ample attention to methods of seasonal 
adjustment (see Fase et al. 1973). A major problem for modelling the real sector of the 
economy was that the Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) did not publish quarterly data on 
the National Accounts in these days. It implied that ESS itself had to construct these data for 
its modelling exercises.  
 
Thus learning about the techniques and skills needed for structural modelling and learning 
what problems could be encountered in a concrete case, the team acquired skills that were 
needed for constructing and managing structural models based on time series data. In the 
process, the team put itself at arm’s length from the existing research department. Its needs 
for data-collection and maintenance, for software and programming, and its computational 
needs in terms of hardware, did not match with the existing organisational structure of the 
research department and so had to be created, either within the Bank, or acquired outside of 
the premises of DNB, as in the case of its remote access to software and computational 
capacities at Petten.  
 
The links between the normative and the model based analysis 
It thus became a major problem for ESS to get its “new” ideas and ways of working 
accepted by the management and senior staff of the Bank. ESS followed two routes. The 
first was to gain international credibility for its modelling work. The second was to connect 
its modelling exercises to the existing monetary analysis with the Bank.  
 
The first route moved the team in fact in a further isolated position to the rest of the research 
department. Fase and his team tried to establish credibility for their studies by publishing in 
international academic journals. Members of the team frequently presented papers at 
international scientific conferences (such as the meetings of the Econometric Society) and at 
seminars organised by other central banks.  As a result, there was little discussion and 
interaction between new and the existing research staff, even though ESS also published in 
locally based journals such as De Economist, Maandschrift Economie and Economisch 
Statistische Berichten, journals that had published the discussions on Holtrop’s monetary 
analysis between the major Dutch economists. (e.g. Tinbergen, Witteveen: see Bos, 1956 
and Klant, 1966 for summaries of the discussions). Members of the research department 
moved only occasionally to ESS and vice versa. 
 
The second way to try and get the work of the team accepted within the Bank was to link it 
as much as possible to the monetary analysis of Holtrop and its underlying philosophy. This 
was done by a direct econometric test of Holtrop’s model (i); by giving detailed attention to 
channels of monetary transmission (ii); by estimation of the elasticities for the demand of 
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money (iii), and most importantly by a model specification that would endogenise the causes 
of money creation from Holtrop’s analysis. 
(i) An example of the first strategy is Den Butter (1979). Just as Duisenberg had made an 
econometric estimate of Holtrop’s formal model in the early seventies, so did the study of 
Den Butter  use modern time series analysis to reconsider the empirics of Holtrop’s 
monetary impulse model. Apart from sorting out simultaneity problems in the data that had 
not been considered in the modelling exercise and allowing for much more sophisticated lag 
mechanisms,  the conclusion of Den Butter’s exercise was unfavourable for Holtrop’s 
analysis, as neither of the monetary impulses distinguished (domestic and external) showed 
significant results and so a more refined analysis was needed to analyse channels of 
monetary transmission than could be provided by Holtrop’s model.5  
 
(ii) In the empirical exercise described above monetary impulses were considered to 
influence income. Thus, a major feature of this form of Dutch monetarism is that monetary 
quantities like (changes in) the money stock and liquidity creation are supposed to have a 
direct influence on the real side of the economy. In other words, the monetary sector is not 
only supposed to have influence on the real economy (albeit often in nominal terms, 
including inflation) indirectly through interest rates but also directly through variables 
representing liquidity, or in a more broad sense, financial wealth. For that reason this direct 
money transmission  has played a major role in modelling of monetary transmission at the 
Bank. A pilot study of Den Butter (1981) showed that adding various alternative 
specifications of direct money transmission (other than the monetary impulses defined by 
the Holtrop model) to an IS-curve of the Dutch economy yielded significant coefficient 
estimates. With respect to the money stock, M2 seemed to be the best indicator of direct 
money transmission whereas M3 and a very broad variable representing financial wealth 
also gave good estimation results. With respect to the asset side of the balance sheet of the 
                                                 
5 The model of equations (1) to (4) can be rewritten to give the equilibrium condition  
  ∆Y = 1/(k+m) (D+E). 
This equation describes how a change in income depends on the monetary impulses. However, when Holtrop 
(1972) estimates the empirical relation between  ∆Y and the monetary impulses: 
  ∆Y = f( D, E),      (5) 
the monetary condition model changes into a causal model. This causal model now consists of 5 equations, 
where equations (1) – (4) are definition equations and (5) is a behavioural equation linking monetary impulses 
to the real economy. The 5 endogenous variables are Lcr, Lact, D, E and ∆Y. The mixing up of the condition 
model with a behavioural model has been one of the main criticisms against Holtrop’s modelling exercise 
(Selten, 1975). Lact is not included in the regression, which now reads  
∆Y = f( Lcr, E), 
because data on Y are used to compute Lact. However this simultaneity problem is also present in 
calculating the external impulse.  The analysis of Den Butter takes these simultaneity problems into 
account but is unable to find a significant influence of the monetary impulses on ∆Y when the 
reference period of Holtrop is extended. The conclusion therefore is that other channels of monetary 
transmission should be considered than the monetary impulses from the Holtrop model. 
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banking sector, total domestic liquidity creation provided the largest additional contribution 
to explaining developments in real income. This empirical study of Den Butter can be 
regarded as a follow up to Kessler’s research on monetary indicators (Kessler, 1974),which 
was also inspired by the idea of Dutch monetarism that direct money transmission is 
important.    
 
(iii) Because of the prominent role of the liquidity ratio in the practical assessment of 
monetary policy it is obvious that much work was done in the early years of ESS on the 
demand for money (see e.g. Fase and Kuné, 1974, 1975,  Den Butter and Fase, 1981). The 
specification in the literature of the demand for money equation was, in these studies, 
extended with an additional explanatory variable representing the cyclical situation. It was in 
accordance with Holtrop’s analysis that the phase of the cycle was assumed to have an 
influence of its own on money demand, in addition to the interest rate, the price level and 
real income as explanatory variables. Indeed, significant coefficients were found for this 
variable. The most important question to be answered by these demand for money studies 
was, however, about the income elasticity of the demand for money. As mentioned before, 
the use of the liquidity ratio as monetary indicator assumed an income elasticity of unity. 
However, in most of the early demand for money studies of Fase and his team, an income 
elasticity somewhat below unity was found. The implication for monetary policy was that, in 
order to be non- inflationary, liquidity creation should be moderated so as to conform to 
decreasing values for the normative liquidity ratio.    
 
The monetary model and the system of sector balance sheets 
 
The focus of monetary policy on the liquidity ratio in the 1970’s implied that money demand 
should be given a prominent place in the monetary sector of the Bank’s model. The demand 
for money equation can be regarded as empirical representation of the LM-curve, where 
money supply is assumed to be given. In this way the money demand function describes the 
feedback mechanism from the real economy to the financial world. The link with Holtrop’s 
monetary analysis is that the demand for money function shows how much money is needed 
in order to accommodate the transactions demand, given the stance of the cycle, and not to 
disturb monetary equilibrium. In line with theories on financial model building (Brainard 
and Tobin, 1968) the monetary sector of the Bank’s model was to be based on a closed 
system of sector balance sheets. It seemed natural that the sectors to be selected should be in 
accordance with the statistical reporting of balance sheets and balance sheet items in the 
Annual Reports and Quarterly Bulletins of the Bank. Therefore the following five sectors 
were distinguished: (i) private sector, (ii) money creating institutions, (iii) central bank, (iv) 
government and (v) the rest of the world. The latter sector was included to formally close the 
system. The next step was to decide what items to include in the balance sheets, and more 
importantly, what items to explain in behavioural equations. In the preparation stage 
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empirical studies were already conducted with respect to major balance sheet items, namely 
money demand and the distribution of money demand over various liquid assets (Fase, 1978, 
1979b), international capital flows (Koning, 1974), demand for bank credit (Fase, 1979a), 
mortgage market (Den Butter et al., 1977) and net foreign assets of banks (Den Butter et al., 
1979).  
 
When specifying a model based on a closed set of balance sheets, it is important to 
determine which items are endogenous in the model. Each item appears once on the asset 
side of a balance sheet and once on a liability side of another balance sheet. So for each item 
it should be decided whether it is determined  at the asset side or at the liability side. 
Moreover each balance sheet has a residual item and the total closed system yields an 
additional residual item which is the pitfall in financial model building Brainard and Tobin 
(1968) report about. In specifying the Bank’s model for the monetary sector, the selection of 
items to be explained by an behavioural equation and of residual items, quite naturally 
resulted from the empirical studies conducted in the preparation stage. The model was set up 
in a normalized specification, i.e. each endogenous variable was determined once as 
dependent variable on the left hand side of the = sign in a model equation. This normalized 
specification made solving the model rather easy and was in line with the modelling practice 
of the CPB at that time. It implied that for each market it had to be decided whether the 
respective balance sheet items were demand or supply determined. Consequently prices and 
interest rates were determined by the opposite side of the market. So they were reformulated 
supply equations when the market was specified as demand determined and vice versa. 
Therefore the model did not describe market equilibriums – as a general equilibrium model 
does – but only equilibrating mechanisms through the price equations.  
 
A major feature of the Bank’s econometric model for the monetary sector (published as 
Fase, 1981, 1984) was that it provided a behavioural description of all items listed in the 
traditional table of the sources of money creation. As mentioned before, this was to ensure 
continuity between the old and the new monetary analysis.  But Holtrop himself showed 
little interest in the econometric approach. For a contribution to a special issue of Openbare 
Uitgaven in 1981, in honour of Goedhart, Holtrop received support from Den Butter. Den 
Butter considered that it might be appropriate to line out the relation between the 
behavioural perspective of the Bank’s model for the monetary sector and Holtrop’s own 
analysis. Therefore Den Butter (1981b) provided an overview showing how the many 
variables of the model could be regrouped in terms of Holtrop’s analysis of the sources of 
money creation. It was also shown how the set up of the balance sheet items in the model 
could bring the table of sources of money creation in accordance with various definitions of 
money (M1, M2 and M3).  Holtrop listened politely to these proposals for the article, but in 
the end decided differently and had others in the Bank prepare a draft article, that reacted on 
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Goedhart’s ideas of a monetary equilibrium in a dynamic economy. So Holtrop decided to 
remain within his own territory of Dutch monetarism  (Holtrop, 1981).  
 
Tinbergen once remarked that Holtrop did not master the art of econometric modelling, 
adding that his considerations on the monetary state of the Netherlands had always been 
profound and instructive (Vanthoor, 1993, 209). One might consider the above anecdote 
about Holtrop’s reaction to the attempt to explicate the relation between his analysis and 
behavioural economic modelling as an illustration of Tinbergen’s judgment. But Holtrop’s 
aversion to the “silly” behavioural equations of the CPB did not mean he was not interested 
in the behaviour of the agents in an economy, and the motives that gave rise to it. Rather, as 
explained by Johan Koopmans, he proceeded by a different kind of stories that were 
crucially dependent on his gifts to detect the clues in the data. We already mentioned  
Holtrop always wrote the first draft of its annual report during his years as president of the 
Bank. This then went back and forth between him and the research department. The research 
department was a sparring partner in sharpening his judgement. But it was his judgement 
nonetheless. At the end of the day, the research department provided him with data that he 
tackled with his “inductions and deductions” to unravel their hidden secrets. Holtrop’s 
disinterest in the new econometric approach to monetary analysis thus may also reveal his 
enduring commitment to a research strategy – and concomitant organisation of research at 
the Bank – that was bound to disappear.   
 
Getting MORKMON at work 
 
After specification and estimation of the models for the monetary and real sectors,  there 
was still a long road to go until the model, which now was given the acronym of 
MORKMON, was ready for practical policy analysis and could act as a worthy substitute of 
the conditional monetary analysis of the Bank. An important (and according to the 
participants in the project most interesting) part of the model construction was solving the 
model and simulating developments in the observation period in an adequate manner i.e. 
with relative small within sample forecast errors in a dynamic simulation. The first 
simulations were, therefore,  intended to investigate the dynamics of the model. Did the 
numerically calculated values of the variables converge sufficiently fast to stable values or 
not? Were there inconsistencies between the descriptions of the working of the relevant 
markets in the model? These were among the questions asked. These simulations were 
combined with a formal analysis of the model structure. This phase of model testing ended 
with a sequence of critical examinations of a simplified version of the model as to the 
plausibility of its implied causal structure. 
 
The next phase of model validation regarded the plausibility of the working of the model. 
The mechanisms described in the model were tested using impulse response simulations. 
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Here the following questions were asked: What was the model structure? What were the 
channels through which shocks moved through the model? Is a change needed in the choice 
of exogenous variables? Are there hidden construction failures in the model? Is there a 
pattern of autocorrelation of residuals in an ex post forecasting exercise ? If so, can we trace 
this to its source, and use the information to improve the quality and forecasting 
performance of the model? These simulations helped to further learn about how to use the 
model in answering real world policy questions. The simulations also contributed to building 
up skills and the tacit knowledge on how to use the model to tell plausible stories on actual 
economic developments. 
 
Finally, on 15 June 1984, Frank den Butter and Martin Fase sent a short note to Nout 
Wellink, then executive director of monetary policy at DNB and from 1997-2011 its 
governor. The subject of the note reads: “MORKMON and monetary policy (your 
question)”. It was a very short summary of two simulations performed with the model. The 
simulations were intended to give meat to the possibilities of using the model for policy 
purposes, the question raised by Wellink in conversation. These first two simulations of the 
pilot version of the MORKMON model compared two different instruments of monetary 
policy on their effectiveness in controlling the quantity of money as measured by M2. In the 
first simulation the official discount rate of the Bank was raised 1%-point in combination 
with the same increase of the short term interest rate. The second simulation examined the 
effects of an exogenous restriction of short term bank-credit of 2 billion guilders in the first 
quarter of the year. Both simulations were to be included in a monograph on MORKMON 
that appeared later that year (De Nederlandsche Bank, 1984). They functioned as a kind of 
show-piece examples to convince Wellink of the merits of the model. That they functioned 
as such may be gathered from the fact that the notice was cc-ed to eleven staff members of 
the Bank, the majority of them in its research department. The more extended versions of 
these simulations (and many others) in the monograph showed that economic policy 
modelling at the Dutch Central Bank had outgrown its laboratory stage to become an 
instrument for monetary policy preparation. 
 
But it did not become its only instrument, just as the now well established group of 
econometricians did not replace, but became a department devoted to scientific research 
separate from the old department of research. Duisenberg, on whose recommendation 
econometric research had set foot into the Bank, but now, after years in the Government 
administration as minister of economic affairs for the Social Democrats, in the same seat as 
Holtrop, put econometric research in its place in monetary policy preparation at the Bank. In 
his introduction to the monograph presenting the econometric model he wrote: “Postulates 
and instinct, theories and hunches, econometric models and the backs of envelopes will all 
make their urgent claims upon the policy maker, but he will need them all.” (De 
Nederlandsche Bank, 1985). As president of the Central Bank, he identified with Holtrop for 
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whom the combination of different sources of evidence should trump the simulations and 
predictions of the Bank’s new integrated model of a monetary and real sector of the 
economy. Yet, on the occasion of the retirement of Van den Belt as director of the CPB, 
Duisenberg made a comparison between the models for the monetary sector of the CPB en 
DNB (Duisenberg, 1984). He proudly quoted the renown Dutch econometrician Henri Theil 
that the CPB had lost its strategic position with respect to DNB, because DNB now also 
possessed an econometric model, unlike the situation in the 1950’s and 1960’s.  
 
Van Els (2000, 83), who was closely involved with the model’s development and use in a 
later stage of modelling at the Bank, argued that it is “rather difficult” to “pin down” the 
exact role of the Bank’s econometric model in policy preparation. “Model information is not 
the only input, but get mixed with other sources of information, part of which will focus on 
institutional and political aspects” . In this quotation we hear the echo of Duisenberg’s 
words written in the foreword of the monograph on MORKMON. Van Elst suspected that 
this was the case at most central banks, with the possible exception of the Bank of Canada 
where the model always seems to have played a central role in its monetary policy 
preparation.  
 
4. Conclusions 
It has been argued that Holtrop’s monetary analysis, which focused on the conditions for the 
neutrality of money, lost its meaning by the end of the seventies because general economic 
conditions had changed so much since the Second World War. To some extent that is 
certainly true. This paper shows, however, that the introduction of structural modelling 
within the Netherlands central bank created a new research environment that in a way 
encompassed Holtrop’s monetary analysis. In accordance with updated economic theory, it 
was much richer in the description of economic mechanisms that play a role in the 
transmission of monetary policy.  These new mechanisms more specifically related to the 
formal description of economic behaviour, to adjustment dynamics and to the role of prices 
(including interest rates) in the markets for money, goods and labour. Yet the major 
philosophy of Holtrop’s monetary analysis and the expert judgement on the neutrality of 
money were preserved in the model. More specifically the ideas of Dutch monetarism 
incorporated into the model were (i) monetary transmission through channels of direct 
money transmission (e.g. wealth effects, ease of credit supply) which go far beyond the 
usual interest rates in the IS-analysis, (ii) feedback mechanisms from the real economic 
sector determining the demand for money, and (iii) behavioural explanation of autonomous 
and induced sources of money supply, where the latter can be influenced by instruments of 
monetary policy and be used to sterilized the autonomous sources, so that monetary policy 
establishes an equilibrium of monetary neutrality. A focal point in this theoretical and 
empirical updating of Holtrop’s monetary analysis was the definition of money. The model 
showed how the various components of the money supply and sources of liquidity (or 
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wealth) creation interacted and were to affect the neutrality of money through transmission 
to, and feedback mechanisms from the real economic sector. This emphasis on the definition 
of money and on the determinants of the demand for money accounts for the fact that the 
liquidity ratio (or velocity of money) served as the target of Holtrop’s monetary decision 
making.   
 
With the emergence of the integrated model, the relation between the president of the Bank 
and its research department changed even when it is difficult, as Van Elst suggests, to pin 
down exactly where and how to locate the influence of the model. Once the model was 
there, it was no longer the president of the Bank who decided what causal influences were 
important and how these might change sign, depending on the circumstances of the moment. 
Rather, the web of causal relations was fixed in the model’s structure. Those who had 
developed the model and ran the simulations knew its limitations and, reading the 
memoranda, listed them as extensively as they could. This created space for the use of other 
sources of information to modify model outcomes. Yet, it would be difficult to simply 
reverse the causal narratives that it produced. Even when judgement legally remained with 
the Bank’s governor, materially it had been relegated to an important extent to the 
econometric model, and to the separate department that was established to develop, manage 
and maintain it. Model stories replaced detective stories. These model stories at DNB have, 
for a long time, been based on various versions of the MORKMON model which was only 
in 2011 replaced by the DELFI model (de Nederlandsche Bank, 2011).  
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